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This study focused on complexity of the self-schema as one factor that 
influences people's responses to social feedback that challenges their established 
view of self Complexity refers to the number of independent attributes included 
in the schema. A card-sorting task (Zajonc, 1960) was used to identify the 
high- and low-complexity groups. Subjects were given bogus feedback relevant 
to the targeted domain of self-knowledge, and changes in self-descriptiveness 
ratings and response latency times were monitored. Results suggest that 
high-complexity subjects were able to attend to and encode the disconfirming 
feedback, while low-complexity subjects responded by rejecting the feedback 
and reasserting positive aspects of the self The implications of these findings 
for clarifying the process of self-schema updating, revision, and change are 
discussed. 
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In the last decade, empirical work on the self-concept has tended to em- 
phasize its stable and enduring nature. Studies have shown that people not 
only prefer social feedback that is consistent with their view of themselves 
(Swann & Read, 1981) but, in addition, tend to ignore or reject discon- 
firming social feedback rather than change the established self-view 
(Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Markus, 1977). Together 
these findings have led investigators to conclude that the self is a relatively 
immutable cognitive s t ruc ture-one  that resists new and threatening infor- 
mation from the social environment. 
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The current emphasis on stability of the self-structure, however, has 
directed attention away from the fact that people must and, in fact, often 
do use social feedback to update or revise the established self-view. Con- 
sider, for example, the high school valedictorian who adjusts her "naturally 
smart and effortlessly successful" self-view to accommodate her mediocre 
first college semester grades or the type-A businessman who modifies his 
"healthy and invulnerable" self-conception to include the recent news that 
he is hypertensive. These examples suggest that the self cannot realistically 
be viewed as a closed system that uniformly resists or rejects all discon- 
firming feedback. In fact, even those who ardently support the conceptu- 
alization of  the self as a stable and enduring cognitive s t ructure  
acknowledge that the maintenance of a relevant and realistic view of the 
self is dependent on the person's ability to use social feedback to update 
or revise the self-view (see Swann& Read, 1981). 
Yet despite the fact that the utilization of social feedback is central 
to the maintenance of a current and realistic self-view, the recent emphasis 
on the stability of the self-structure has meant that little empirical attention 
has been directed toward understanding the factors that enable people to 
consider and use social feedback. In this paper properties of the self-struc- 
ture that play a role in shaping the individual's response to disconfirming 
social feedback are explored. Building on empirical work that examined 
the effects of cognitive complexity on the utilization of contradictory social 
information, it is posited that people with highly complex self-schemas may 
be more able to consider and use disconfirming feedback to update their 
self-view than those with less complex self-schemas. Furthermore, it is ar- 
gued that previous work that has highlighted the stable and resistant nature 
of the self-structure has focused on changes in global self-defining attrib- 
utes rather than exploring more subtle process measures that might reflect 
the person's ability to consider and encode the new and contradictory self- 
relevant information. 
Cognitive Complexity 
The concept of cognitive complexity was derived from Werner's de- 
velopmental theory and Kelly's theory of personal constructs (Bieri, 1955; 
Burleson, 1987; Crockett, 1965). It is based on the assumption that people 
represent objects in memory as systems of bidirectional dimensions or con- 
structs. Although the original conceptualization of complexity focused both 
on the number of constructs within the cognition and the extent to which 
the constructs were hierarchically organized (for example, see Crockett, 
1965), recent definitions focus exclusively on the quantity of information 
Self-Schema and Responses to Disconfirming Feedback 163 
(Burleson, 1987). Complexity is generally defined as the number of distinct 
or independent attributes included in the cognitive structure (Bieri, 1955; 
Linville, 1985, 1987; O'Keefe & Sypher, 1981; Scott, Osgood, & Peterson, 
1979). A highly complex cognition is one that includes many distinct units 
of information, while a less complex structure consists of relatively fewer 
distinct units. 
Linville (1985) examined the effects of complexity of the self-concept 
on stability of affect and self-esteem. This study focused on the total array 
of knowledge about the self available in memory. Individuals with high 
complexity and those with low complexity of the total self-concept were 
given positive or negative feedback about their performance on a cognitive 
task. The findings revealed that low-complexity subjects responded to the 
feedback with more extreme changes in mood and self-esteem in the di- 
rection consistent with the feedback than did high-complexity subjects. 
Based on the data, one can conclude that low-complexity subjects tend to 
focus on and react to a single perspective of the self while apparently losing 
sight of other available self-conceptions. 
Although the findings of Linville's (1985) study provided evidence to 
suggest that complexity of the self-concept plays an important role in the 
processing of incongruent information, many important questions remain 
unanswered. Do the differences in emotional reactivity reflect differences 
in ability to attend to and utilize the new information? Does the emotional 
reactivity of low-complexity subjects mean that they are more likely to take 
in and encode the new information? Do high-complexity subjects maintain 
stability in affect and self-esteem by blocking out or ignoring disconfirming 
feedback? Or does the rich, highly complex structure enable the individual 
to incorporate the new information while maintaining the established self- 
view? 
Cognitive Complexity and Bivalent Information 
The findings of a series of studies on impression formation offer fur- 
ther insight into the effects of cognitive complexity on the processing of 
incongruent information. In these studies investigators found that individu- 
als with highly elaborated cognitive structures of other people were more 
able to consider and use contradictory information to form an integrated 
understanding of another person than those with less elaborated structures 
(Crockett, 1965; Leventhal, 1957; Mayo & Crockett, 1964 ). Using the typi- 
cal impression formation paradigm, subjects were presented with a collec- 
tion of positive and negative descriptors of a target person. High-complexity 
subjects were able to attend to and use bivalent information to form an 
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impression of the target that was consistent with the information provided. 
In contrast, low-complexity subjects used only one cluster of traits, either 
those presented first in the description (i.e., primacy effect) or those pre- 
sented last (i.e., recency effect), while ignoring the other conflicting traits. 
Two different but highly related explanations of the mechanisms un- 
derlying the relationship between complexity of the cognitive structure and 
responses to bivalent information have been offered. The first explanation 
is based on the argument that differentiation and hierarchical organization 
of the cognition are cooccurring, such that as a cognition becomes more 
highly differentiated, it necessarily becomes more hierarchically organized. 
As the hierarchical structuring becomes more elaborated, the person has 
available in memory a collection of superordinate abstractions that can be 
used to reconcile disparate behaviors or traits (Crockett, 1965; Mayo & 
Crockett, 1964; Metlzer, Crockett, & Rosenkrantz, 1966). A second expla- 
nation focuses simply on the amount of information included in the cog- 
nitive structure. According to this view the availability of many distinct units 
of information enables more flexible processing of information (Bieri, 1955; 
Burleson, 1987; Scott et al., 1979). 
Complexity of the Self-Schema and Processing Disconfirming Feedback 
Based on the findings from the impression formation literature, it is 
posited that the availability of a highly complex self-schema will enable the 
individual to attend to and incorporate social feedback that is incongruent 
with the generalized view of the self in the domain. In contrast, when a 
schema is less complex, the individual has a smaller and less diverse array 
of information available in memory that can be brought to bear in proc- 
essing the new and contradictory information. In this case the individual 
has less flexibility in thinking about the self and, consequently, may have 
more difficulty attending to and utilizing the new and contradictory infor- 
mation. 
The study that follows was designed as a preliminary test of this hy- 
pothesis. However, unlike previous studies which focused on changes in 
self-ratings on trait adjectives as a primary indicator of the person's accep- 
tance or rejection of the disconfirming feedback, this study was founded 
on the idea that response latency times for the self-rating judgments may 
be a more sensitive measure of whether the new information was encoded 
in memory. 
The focus on response latency is based on the view that self-schemas 
are hierarchical organizations of knowledge in which situation specific im- 
ages of the self are nested within higher order trait abstractions (see Hastie, 
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1981; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Typically, judg- 
ments about the self in the domain are made quickly and efficiently by 
comparing the stimulus to a higher-level trait abstraction. However, under 
certain circumstances, the lower-level situation-specific memories are 
evoked. The use of this rich, detailed collection of memories as the proc- 
essing framework leads to longer response latency time for self-descriptive- 
ness judgments (Lewicki, 1986; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Based on this model of the self-schema, it is argued that a piece of 
disconfirming feedback about the self will be encoded as a situation-specific 
memory at a lower level in the hierarchical structure. The recent addition 
of an evaluatively incongruent piece of information may make the situ- 
ation-specific memories more readily accessible and, at least temporarily, 
increase the likelihood that they will be evoked during subsequent judg- 
ments about the self. Consequently, the process of making the judgment 
about the self-descriptiveness of a stimulus is more complicated and, hence, 
time-consuming as this rich and evaluatively mixed collection of situation- 
specific memories is scanned to determine the degree of congruence be- 
tween the stimulus and the self (Lewicki, 1986). 
The encoding of evaluatively inconsistent feedback would not, how- 
ever, be expected to cause a measurable change in the content of sub- 
sequent judgments about the self. Because the feedback is encoded as one 
of many situation-specific memories in the domain, its power to influence 
subsequent judgments will be diluted and, therefore, minimal. Although 
the task of evaluating the congruence between the stimulus and the self 
becomes more complicated, it is likely that the match between the stimulus 
and the self will be determined by the majority of memories in the domain 
rather than by any single instance. 
If on the other hand, the new information is ignored or rejected and, 
therefore, not encoded within schema, the cognitive framework underlying 
the judgment process will remain unaltered. In this case the higher-order 
trait abstraction is likely to continue to serve as the framework for the 
judgment, and the processing time for relevant self-evaluative judgments 
made after receiving the feedback should remain unchanged. 
METHOD 
An initial step in preparing for this study was to identify a group of 
individuals who had in common a domain of self-knowledge and to measure 
the complexity of that self-schema. The "student" self-schema in an under- 
graduate college population was chosen because it was assumed that all 
students would have some established conceptions of themselves in the role 
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and that these self-conceptions would generally be highly valued and cen- 
trally self-defining. 
During the first of two experimental sessions, complexity of the stu- 
dent self-schema and self-descriptiveness ratings of the self in the domain 
were measured. The self-descriptiveness ratings were computerized, and 
unbeknownst to the subject, response latency times for the ratings were 
also measured. At the completion of the session subjects were asked by a 
different experimenter to participate in an ostensibly unrelated study de- 
signed to validate a new intelligence test. 
During the second experimental session approximately 2 weeks later, 
subjects were asked to complete a fictitious intelligence test and were given 
bogus feedback about their performance. Self-descriptiveness ratings were 
measured again after the feedback was given, enabling the amount of 
change in response latency times and self-descriptiveness ratings caused by 
the feedback to be determined. 
Subjects 
For session 1, subjects were 151 male and female undergraduate stu- 
dents. Subjects were recruited from classes throughout the University and 
were paid $10 for their participation. One hundred nineteen of the original 
151 subjects (79%) completed session 2. 2 Of those 119 subjects, 63% (n = 
75) were female and 37% (n = 44) were male. Subjects were paid an ad- 
ditional $5 for session 2. 
Session 1 
Procedure and measures. For the first laboratory session, subjects were 
run in small groups comprised of one to four subjects. Subjects were told 
by the experimenter that the purpose of the study was to learn about in- 
dividual differences in the way people think and feel about themselves. The 
experimental session took approximately 11/2 hours to complete. During this 
session subjects completed the following measures: 
2Subjects who  agreed to part icipate in session 2 did not  differ significantly f rom those who  
refused to part icipate in differentiation scores (participants: M = 19.1, SD = 5.5; 
nonpart ic ipants :  M = 19.9, SD = 5.4, t < 1) nor  in unity scores (participants:  M = 0.265, 
SD = 0.109; nonpart icipants:  M = 0.262, SD = 0.125, t < 1). The  two groups  also did not  
differ in basel ine measures  of  self-descriptiveness ratings (participants:  M = 8.9, SD = 1.3; 
nonpart ic ipants :  M = 9.0, SD = 1.0, t < 1) nor  in baseline response  latency t ime for the 
self-descriptiveness ratings (participants:  M --- 5.04 sec, SD = 1.31; nonpart icipants:  M = 
5.16, SD = 1.49, t < 1) suggesting that motivation to participate was not  related to the 
independen t  or  dependen t  variables. 
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1. Complexity of the self-schema. A card-sorting method for measuring 
the organizational properties of cognitive structures developed by Zajonc 
(1954, 1960) was used to measure complexity of the student self-schema. 
For this measure subjects were first given a stack of 52 blank index cards 
which were marked from A to ZZ. The subjects were then instructed: 
Now I would like you to think of  yourself  in the  s tuden t  role. On  each card 
separately write one characteristic which describes you as a student.  You can put  
down whatever  comes to your  mind, since there is no one list of  characteristics that 
can be considered as either "correct" or  "incorrect." Everyone's  thoughts  about 
themselves are different. 
Write down as many  characteristics as you feel are necessary to describe yourself  
as a student.  You may have too many or too few cards, but this shouldn ' t  bother  
you. If you find that  you need additional cards raise your hand  and I will bring 
extra cards to your seat. Work rapidly. 
Next subjects were instructed: 
It is possible that  some of  the characteristics you identified are related to one 
another .  They may depend on one another  in such a way that if one changes,  the 
other  one would change too. Suppose the table in front of  you was bigger than it 
is now. Then  it would become heavier. This means  that the weight of  the table 
depends  on the  size. The  relationships between characteristics you put  down may 
not  be so obvious and so simple, but try to decide whether  such relationships exist, 
nevertheless.  To do this lay out  the cards in front of  you in alphabetical order, and 
list all the characteristics which would change if Characteristic A were changed,  
a b s e n t  o r  u n t r u e  o f  you ;  list all the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  tha t  wou ld  c h a n g e  if 
Characteristic B were changed,  absent or untrue  of you, etc. 
The responses to these tasks were used to identify subjects with high 
complexity and those with low complexity of the student self-schema. 
In this study complexity refers to two properties of the self-schema: 
(1) differentiation--the number of attributes included in the self-schema and 
(2) unity the degree of dependence among the attributes included in the 
schema~ High complexity refers to self-schemas that have many independent 
attributes included in the structure, whereas low complexity refers to self- 
schemas that have few attributes that are highly interdependent. 
A differentiation score was computed by counting the number of 
characteristics generated during the first task. To calculate a unity score, 
the responses to the second task were used to form a dependency matrix 
such that when Aj caused a change in A i a value of 1 was assigned. The 
total dependency of an element was calculated by summing the row entries, 
and the total dependency of the schema was calculated by summing the 
dependencies across all characteristics. To compare the degree of unity 
across schemas with varying levels of differentiation, it is necessary to nor- 
malize the measure of unity by dividing the total dependence of the schema 
by the total number of possible dependencies of the schema: 
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Y dependency (Ai) 
Unity = i= T 
n(n-1) 
2. Domain specific self-descriptiveness measure. The domain-specific 
self-descriptiveness measure consisted of 38 semantic differential scales. 
Thirty-five scales measured the individual's view of the self in the student 
domain; 25 scales focused on performance aspects of the student role (e.g., 
competent-incompetent, intelligent-unintelligent), and 10 focused on the 
social aspects of the student role. Three practice items were also included. 
Each bipolar set of adjectives was presented on a 12-point scale. The 
positive and negative self-descriptors were alternately presented on the 
right side of the scale. The scales were presented on a cathode ray tube 
screen (CRT) in four randomly determined orders of presentation. Each 
item appeared on CRT for a maximum of 30 sec. There was a 1-sec interval 
between the subject's response and the presentation of the next scale. Sub- 
jects were asked to key in the number that best described them on the 
dimension. Response latency times (interval between when the scale first 
appeared on the screen and the moment when the first key was struck) 
were also recorded. Subjects were unaware that response latency times were 
being measured. 
A total student self-descriptiveness score was determined for each 
subject by computing a mean of 23 performance-related student scales. Of 
the original 25 performance scales, two were deleted to increase the inter- 
nal consistency of the total measure to an alpha coefficient of .87. For this 
measure scores were computed such that the higher the score, the more 
positive the self-descriptive ratings in the student domain. 
3. Importance of behavioral domains. After the self-descriptiveness 
measure was completed, subjects were asked to rate six behavioral domains 
(e.g., friend, athlete, student) according to the importance of each domain 
to their overall view of themselves. Each domain was presented on a 12- 
point scale, ranging from extremely important to extremely unimportant. 
High scores on this measure reflect high importance of the domain. 
4. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES 
was used to measure the individual's global self-satisfaction. The RSES is 
a 10-item Guttman scale (e.g., "I have a number of good qualities"). Item 
values (ranging from 1 to 4) are summed to compute the self-esteem score. 
High scores reflect positive self-esteem. 
5. Written fluency. To examine the effects of individual differences in 
ability and motivation to communicate thoughts in writing on the differen- 
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tiation and unity scores, a measure of written fluency was completed. Sub- 
jects were shown a 5 x 7-in black and white photograph of a young couple 
walking down the street and were given 7 min to write a story about the 
picture. A written fluency score was computed by counting the number of 
words written. 
6. Intelligence Measure. At the end of Session 1 subjects were asked 
to report either their college entry Scholastic Aptitude Total scores (SAT) 
or their American College Test scores (ACT) as an indicator of intelli- 
gence. 
Session 2 
At the completion of the first experimental session, subjects were ap- 
proached by a second experimenter ostensibly looking for volunteers to par- 
ticipate in a study designed to test and validate an intelligence test. The 
names and phone numbers of subjects who were willing to participate in 
the study were taken. Approximately 2 weeks later the experimenter con- 
tacted each subject by phone and a time for the experimental session was 
scheduled. 
For this session, subjects were run individually. At the beginning of 
session 2, the subject was asked to complete the Michigan Conceptual In- 
telligence Test, which was actually a modified version of the Quick Test 
of Intelligence (Ammons & Ammons, 1962). When the test was completed, 
the experimenter left the room for several minutes after she explained that 
she would enter the subject's responses into the computer for scoring. The 
experimenter returned to the room several minutes later with a computer 
printout that gave a raw score and a percentile ranking. Subjects were ran- 
domly assigned to either the success condition, in which they were told 
that they scored in the top 3%, or the failure condition, in which they were 
told that they scored in the bottom 47% of college students who had com- 
pleted the test to date. 
After subjects received the feedback, the experimenter told them that 
in order to validate the test and verify the norms, it was necessary for her 
to collect information about their personal backgrounds. She explained that 
the background information questionnaire was computerized so that sub- 
jects would be asked to enter their responses at a computer terminal. She 
then left the room after she stated that she would check to make sure that 
the computer was ready. The experimenter left the room without providing 
an opportunity for the subject to discuss his/her score. She returned after 
a 5-min interval and the subjects then completed a demographic data ques- 
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tionnaire and the self-descriptiveness measure. 3 At the completion of ses- 
sion 2, all subjects were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
RESULTS 
Organizational Properties of the Student Self-Schema 
As expected, the student domain of self-knowledge was generally con- 
sidered highly important to the participants' overall views of themselves 
(M = 10.09, SD = 1.79, on a 12-point scale). However, despite the overall 
importance of this domain of self-knowledge, considerable variability in the 
organizational properties of the self-schema was found. For the total sam- 
ple, the mean differentiation score (the number of characteristics included 
in the schema) was 19.3 (range = 10-34) and the mean unity score (the 
degree of dependence among the attributes included in the schema) was 
0.26 (range = 0.07 to 0.62; possible range = 0 to 1.0 where 1.0 is total 
dependency among the attributes). 
In the total sample, differentiation and unity were moderately and 
negatively correlated, r(135) = -.30, p < .001. In this domain of self-knowl- 
edge, schemas that were highly elaborated or had many characteristics in- 
cluded within them tended to have more independence among the 
attributes that schemas that included fewer characteristics. 
Identification of High- and Low-Complexity Groups 
For the purpose of examining the relationship between complexity of 
the self-schema and ability to attend to and incorporate disconfirming feed- 
back, two groups of subjects were identified: individuals with high com- 
plexity of the student self-schema and individuals with low complexity of 
the student self-schema. Complexity is a combined measure that refers to 
both the number of attributes included in the schema and the amount of 
interdependence among the attributes. Placement in the high- and low- 
complexity groups was determined by the differentiation and unity scores 
derived from the card-sorting measure. 
A median split was used to identify high and low differentiation sub- 
jects and high- and low-unity subjects. A cross tabulation was then used to 
3The 10 social items and the three practice items were deleted from the time 2 
self-descriptiveness measure to decrease the similarity between the time 1 and time 2 
measures and, thereby, reduce the likelihood that subjects would recognize the association 
between the two experimental sessions. 
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identify subjects who had high differentiation scores and low unity scores, 
the high complexity group (n = 34) and those who had low differentiation 
scores and high unity scores, the low complexity group (n = 37). 4 
Equivalence of Groups 
One assumption underlying this experimental manipulation was that 
most subjects in this population would have a highly positive self-schema 
established in the student domain and, therefore, the negative feedback 
would be experienced as a threat to the self. To test this assumption, base- 
line levels of the student self-descriptiveness ratings were examined. For 
the high- and low-complexity groups combined, the mean self-descriptive- 
ness rating was 9.0 (SD = 1.4) on a 12-point scale, suggesting that, in gen- 
eral ,  subjects  viewed themselves  as above-average s tudents .  Group  
comparisons revealed that the high-complexity group (M = 9.0, SD = 1.4) 
and the low-complexity group (M = 8.9, SD = 1.4) had very positive and 
approximately equal self-descriptiveness ratings at time 1, t < 1. The two 
groups also had high and approximately equal baseline levels of global self- 
esteem as measured by the RSES (high-complexity M = 31.4, SD = 5.1; 
low-complexity M = 31.3, SD = 5.2; t < 1). 
To examine the effects of ability and motivation to communicate one's 
thoughts in writing and intelligence on group placement, written fluency, 
SAT and ACT scores were compared between the two groups. No signifi- 
cant differences were found (all t < 1). 
No significant differences were found between the two groups in time 
1 response latency scores (high-complexity M = 4.66, SD = 1.24; low-com- 
plexity M = 5.12, SD = 1.34, t = 1.49, p = .14). In addition, no gender 
differences were found in the independent nor dependent variables, and, 
therefore, gender was not considered in any of the subsequent analyses. 
4The decision to treat complexity as a single dichotomous variable is based on the theoretical 
view that processing differences occur after the cognitive structure reaches some critical level 
of complexity rather than expecting continuous processing differences with each incremental 
increase in the number of independent conceptions included in the structure. In other words, 
it is postulated that some critical number of independent conceptions within the self-schema 
is necessary before the individual is able to encode disconfirming information. Until the 
critical number of self-conceptions is available, individuals will have difficulty processing the 
disconfirming information. This view is consistent with most previous research on cognitive 
complexity. 
172 Stein 
Response Latency Times for Self-Descriptiveness Judgments 
The primary hypothesis guiding this study was that high-complexity sub- 
jects would be more likely than low-complexity subjects to attend to and en- 
code the disconfirming feedback. Because of the availability in memory of 
this new information, high-complexity subjects were expected to be slower to 
make relevant self-descriptiveness judgments after receiving the failure feed- 
back than the low-complexity group. Furthermore, because the success feed- 
back was consistent with the sample's highly positive self-view in the student 
domain, the same differences in response latency times were not expected 
between the high- and low-complexity subjects in the success condition. 
To test this hypothesis an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model 
was used to determine how response latency times for the self-descriptive- 
ness judgments varied with complexity of the student self-schema and feed- 
back condition. The dependent variable for this analysis was the mean 
response latency change score. This score was calculated by subtracting the 
time 1 mean response latency score for the student self-descriptiveness 
judgments from the time 2 score. For the response latency change score, 
the larger the negative number, the faster the subject was relative to time 
1. The time 1 mean response latency score was used as the covariate and 
condition (success/failure) and complexity (high/low) were included in the 
model as independent variables. 
Results of the covariance analysis revealed an expected significant re- 
lationship between the covariate, time 1 response latency score, and the 
dependent measure, the response latency change score, F(1, 70) = 47.61, 
p < .001, indicating that, the slower the subject was at time 1, the more 
change there was between time 1 and time 2. A significant main effect for 
complexity was also found, suggesting that high-complexity subjects expe- 
rienced less change between time 1 and time 2 response latency scores (M 
= -0.41 sec) than the low-complexity group (M = -0.98 sec) regardless of 
Table I. Mean Response Latency Scores (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) for Low- 
and High-Complexity Subjects in the Failure and Success Conditions 
Failure Success 
Response latency Low High Low High 
scores (see) complexity complexity complexity complexity 
Time 1 4.88 (1.29) 4.59 (1.09) 5.33 (1.38) 4.71 (1.35) 
Time 2 3.71 (0.89) 4.54 (0.98) 4.51 (1.02) 4.08 (1.13) 
Change score a -1.17 (0.80) -0.05 (1.20) -0.82 (0.83) -0.63 (0.97) 
aFor the response latency change scores, the larger the negative number, the faster subjects 
were relative to time 1. 
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the feedback condition, F (1, 70) = 4.19, p < .05. Also as predicted, a 
significant two-way interaction between complexity and condition was 
found, F(1, 70) = 9.16, p = .004. 
Planned contrasts shown in Table I revealed that, in the failure con- 
dition, high-complexity subjects experienced significantly less change in re- 
sponse latency scores between time 1 and time 2 than the low-complexity 
group, t(28) = 3.06, p = .005. In the success condition, no significant dif- 
ference in response latency change scores was found between the high- 
and low-complexity subjects, t(39) < 1. 
In addition, no significant differences in mean response latency change 
scores were found between the low-complexity subjects in the success and 
failure conditions. However, high-complexity subjects in the failure condition 
tended to experience less change between time 1 and time 2 response latency 
scores than the high-complexity subjects in the success condition, but this 
difference failed to reach significance, t(32) = -1.54, p = .13. 
Analysis of covariance using the time 1 response latency score as the 
covariate and the time 2 response latency score as the dependent variable 
revealed the same pattern of effects. 5 
Self-Descriptiveness Ratings 
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was also used to determine 
how changes in self-descriptiveness judgments varied with complexity of the 
student self-schema and feedback condition. The dependent variable for 
this analysis was the mean self-descriptiveness change score (time 2 mean 
self-descriptiveness score minus time 1 mean self-descriptiveness score). 
For the mean self-descriptiveness change score, the larger the positive num- 
ber, the more positive the self-rating was at time 2 compared to time 1. 
The time 1 mean self-descriptiveness score was used as the covariate, and 
condition (success/failure) and complexity (high/low) were entered as inde- 
pendent variables. 
SMost past research has treated complexity as a dichotomous variable. To find out whether  
the results depended on using complexity as dichotomy, a regression analysis was conducted 
to examine the relationship of  response latency to complexity and condition, when complexity 
was represented as a continuous variable. For this analysis, a continuous measure of 
complexity was constructed giving equal weight to its two components  by the following steps: 
(a) Unity was reverse-scored, indicating independence,  (b) the differentiation and 
independence scores were t ransformed to z-scores, and the z-scores were added together.  In 
the analysis, response latency change scores were regressed on time 1 latency, the continuous 
complexity score, condition (entered as a dummy variable), and the product  of complexity 
and condition. This analysis found a significant interaction between the complexity and 
condition term, t(102) = 2.13, p = .036, of the same form as shown when complexity was 
treated as a dichotomy. 
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The results of the covariance analysis revealed an expected significant 
relationship between the covariate, the time 1 self-descriptiveness score and 
the dependent measure, self-descriptiveness change score, F(1, 70) = 9.90, 
p = .002, indicating that the lower the self-descriptiveness rating at time 
1, the more change there was between the time 1 and time 2 scores. In 
addition, a significant main effect for complexity was found, F(1, 70) = 
5.17, p < .03, suggesting that high-complexity subjects experienced less 
change in their self-descriptiveness scores between time 1 and time 2 than 
the low-complexity subjects, regardless of the feedback condition. The two- 
way interaction effect between condition and complexity failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 70) = 1.96, p < .17. 
Although a significant two-way interaction was not found, the planned 
two-group comparisons were completed. As shown in Table II, there is a 
trend in the data suggesting that low-complexity subjects experienced a 
greater increase in self-descriptiveness scores after receiving the failure 
feedback than high-complexity subjects in the same condition t(28) = 2.94, 
p = .007. No differences in mean self-descriptiveness change scores were 
found between the high- and low-complexity subjects in the success condi- 
tion. Similarly, no differences were found between the low-complexity sub- 
jects in the failure and success conditions nor between the high-complexity 
groups in the failure and success conditions. 6 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study lend preliminary support to the hypothesis 
that complexity of the self-schema plays an important role in shaping the 
Table I1. Mean Self-Descriptiveness Scores (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) for Low- 
and High-Complexity Subjects in the Failure and Success Conditions 
Failure Success 
Self- 
descriptiveness Low High Low High 
scores complexity complexity complexity complexity 
Time 1 8.67 (1.52) 8.95 (1.86) 9.14 (1.34) 9.06 (1.07) 
Time 2 9.22 (1.46) 8.87 (1.70) 9.42 (1.28) 9.19 (1.05) 
Change score a 0.55 (0.48) -0.08 (0.70) 0.29 (0.78) 0.14 (0.64) 
aFor the self-descriptiveness change scores, the larger the positive number, the more positive 
the self-rating was at time 2 compared to time 1. 
6A regression analysis was also used to examine the relationship between complexity and 
condition and the mean self-descriptiveness change score. No reliable relationships were 
detected. 
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person's response to social feedback that challenges the established self- 
view. As expected, the response latency times for the self-descriptiveness 
judgments provided valuable information about the processing differences 
between high- and low-complexity subjects. The fact that all groups had 
faster response latency times at time 2 is probably attributable to familiarity 
with the measurement technique. Yet despite the fact that all groups were 
equally familiar with the technique at time 2, high-complexity subjects in 
the failure condition sped up less at time 2 than the low-complexity subjects 
in the same condition. Apparently high-complexity subjects failed to dem- 
onstrate the same improvement in their response latency scores because 
they attended to the new and inconsistent information about the self. Once 
available in memory, the inconsistent information slowed down the sub- 
sequent self-evaluative judgments. The high-complexity individual could no 
longer quickly and efficiency endorse the intelligent trait adjectives as 
highly self-descriptive. Rather the individual had to engage in more thought 
before the judgments could be made. 
The fact that low-complexity subjects in the failure condition experi- 
enced a marked decrease in response latency time between time 1 and 
time 2 suggests that the low complexity subjects did not take in the new 
and inconsistent information. In this case the lack of a rich and differen- 
tiated structure limited the individual's ability to attend to and encode the 
new information. Consequently, when subsequent self-descriptiveness judg- 
ments were made, no additional processing time was needed to reconcile 
the new and inconsistent information with the established self-view. 
The pattern of changes in self-descriptiveness ratings provides addi- 
tional insight into processing differences between the two groups. The one 
clear finding in this analysis is that high-complexity subjects experienced 
less change in their self-descriptiveness ratings than the low-complexity sub- 
jects regardless of the feedback condition. Even though the response la- 
tency measures indicate that the high-complexity subjects did take in and 
consider the inconsistent information, the pattern of findings for the self- 
descriptiveness ratings suggests that the individual's generalized view of the 
self in the domain was not measurably altered by this single piece of in- 
formation. 
When taken together these data support the view that a highly com- 
plex self-schema may be considered a stable but flexible cognitive structure. 
The schema may be considered stable in that the general view of the self 
is not capriciously altered each time a new and inconsistent piece of self- 
relevant information is encountered. This stability is, however, not main- 
tained by rigidly blocking out or ignoring inconsistent feedback. Rather, 
the individual with a highly complex self-schema has the capacity to con- 
sider and take in a broader range of information about the self and in 
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doing so creates a means by which the scheme can be further elaborated, 
modified, or changed. 
The fact that low-complexity subjects in this study experienced more 
change between time 1 and time 2 in their self-descriptiveness ratings than 
the high-complexity group is consistent with the results of previous work 
that suggests that low-complexity subjects react to new information about a 
target with a more extreme evaluation (Linville, 1982, 1985; Linville & Jones, 
1980). The one finding that is surprising is that low-complexity subjects 
tended to describe themselves more positively after the failure feedback was 
given. Although the response latency data suggest that low-complexity sub- 
jects did not take in the failure feedback, the self-description data suggest 
that the feedback did trigger a defensive reaction. The positive increase in 
self-descriptiveness scores suggests that low-complexity subjects did not sim- 
ply ignore the inconsistent feedback but more actively sought to discount 
the feedback by reaffirming the strongly positive view of the self in the do- 
main. In this way stability of the self is maintained, but flexibility to consider 
new information about the self is compromised. 
The idea that complexity of the self-concept plays an important role 
in shaping responses to challenging feedback may help to clarify results of 
studies reported by Power and colleagues (Power & Brewin, 1990; Power, 
Brewin, Stuessy, & Mahony, 1991). In the 1990 study, Power and Brewin 
found that exposure to self-esteem threatening and survival-threatening 
stimuli (i.e., written statements such as, "You fail to get the job you want" 
or "You are assaulted") led to a tendency for subjects to endorse more 
positive adjectives as self-descriptive at a faster rate than negative adjectives. 
In the 1991 study, exposure to basic negative emotion words such as sad, 
fear, and anger led to a similar pattern of findings. The results of this current 
study suggest that the trends in Power and colleagues' findings perhaps could 
be clarified by taking into account the level of complexity of the self-struc- 
ture. Rather than viewing defensive self-affirmation as universal, it may be 
more appropriately seen as a type of response linked to a specific organi- 
zation of the self-structure. Furthermore, the fact that survival-threatening 
stimuli and negative emotion words also triggered the self-affirmation proc- 
ess raises the possibility that the processing differences observed in low-com- 
plexity subjects may be set in motion by a broad range of threats to the self 
that go beyond direct challenges to self-esteem. Additional research is 
needed to clarify the nature of the stimuli and the level of involvement of 
the self that is necessary for the defensive response to occur. 
Of course at this point in time, the long-term consequences of the 
observed processing differences are unknown. Although one can speculate 
that the high-complexity individual's ability to take in and consider new 
information is adaptive and represents a type of flexibility in thinking nec- 
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essary to maintain a realistic and current conception of oneself, an alter- 
native hypothesis is equally plausible. Given that a variety of cognitive dis- 
tortions including the maintenance of an unrealistically positive view of 
one's self and one's future are associated with higher levels of mental and 
physical health (see Taylor & Brown, 1988), it is possible that the process- 
ing style of the low-complexity individual is highly functional (see Powers 
et al., 1991). From this view the ability to actively resist discomforting feed- 
back and maintain a highly positive self-view may be seen as an important 
self-regulatory function that contributes to sustained optimism and a posi- 
tive state of well-being. Additional studies are needed to replicate the find- 
ings of this study and to examine the short- and long-term cognitive and 
affective consequences of these different information processing styles. 
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